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CHAPTER X OR SCHACKNO ACT PROCEEDINGS?
NATHAN SIEGEL
Recently three decisions have been handed down by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit which involve the question of whether a
petition under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act is filed in good faith when
there is a prior Schackno Act proceeding pending in the state court.1 The
problem presented as a result of these decisions transcends in importance
the immediate issues involved. That problem is whether the federal courts
shall yield their paramount jurisdiction in bankruptcy to the state courts.
Preliminary to a discussion of this problem and these decisions of the court,
it may be well to sketch first the nature and history of proceedings under the
Schackno Act.
The Schackno Act Proceedings
In New York in 1933 there were outstanding certificates of participation in
guaranteed mortgages in an amount of about one billion dollars. Over
seventy-five per cent in amount of these mortgages was in default.2 A number
of large bond and mortgage companies had been placed in either rehabilitation
or liquidation proceedings by the Superintendent of Insurance. It was feared
that the foreclosure of these defaulted mortgages at that time would ruin the
owners of real estate and seriously depress the value of the mortgage securities.
The New York state legislature, therefore, declared a public emergency and
enacted the so-called Schackno Act.3 By virtue of this act, and the Mortgage
Commission Act of 19354 which supplemented it, machinery was set up where-
by certificate holders, who formerly could exercise their right of ownership
in their mortgages only by unanimous action, were allowed by the vote of
two-thirds in amount to bind the rights of all. 5 Additional special terms were
created to handle the cases which flowed into the courts. The procedure
which was followed there is briefly as follows: Upon the request of the
holders of at least fifteen per cent of the principal amount of a mortgage
investment, a plan of reorganization would be proposed ;" or the Mortgage
lBrooklyn Trust Co. v. Rembaugh, 110 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); In re Castle
Beach Apartments, 113 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; In re Blinrig Realty Corp., 114
F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). The author, who is associated with David W. Kahn,
Esq., was of counsel in the Rembaugh Case.2Report to the Governor by George W. Alger, Commissioner appointed under the
Executive Law (Aug. 5, 1934) Appendices IV and V.
3L. 1933, c. 745 as amended, N. Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 1796 et seq.4L. 1935, c. 290 as amended, N. Y. UNCONsoL. LAws §§ 1752 et seq.
5§ 7 of the Mortgage Commission Act, supra note 4; § 6 (3) and § 8 of the Schackno
Act, supra note 3.
6§ 6 (1) of the Schackno Act, supra note 3.
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Commission would, pursuant to the power delegated to it,7 investigate the
earning capacity of the property involved, make its recommendations to the
court, and propose a plan of reorganization which incorporated these recom-
mendations. The plan might provide that the trustee be elected by the
certificate holders or that he be the nominee of the court." Notice of the
proceeding and plan would then be given to the certificate holders; and if
sixty-six and two-thirds per cent consented to the plan, and the court approved
it as fair and equitable, it would become effective. 9
A declaration of trust was made the source of the trustee's powers. The
customary provision to be found in this declaration vested the trustee "with
all the rights and powers of an absolute owner of the property." The trustee's
power was limited only to the extent that it could not extend a bond and
mortgage or reduce the rate of interest or sell except upon permission of the
court. The trust was terminable upon the written application of two-thirds
of the certificate holders and the approval of the court. After the consumma-
tion of the reorganization, an order would be entered declaring that the court
retained jurisdiction until the complete liquidation of the trust estate and
termination of the trust."0
If after a period of operation under the plan an owner of the property
found the terms of amortization and interest payments so onerous that he was
unable to meet them, the trustee had several alternate remedies. He could
foreclose, take title, and then administer the property for the benefit of
certificate holders. Thereafter, he could sell the property subject to the
outstanding mortgage and arrange new terms with a new owner. Or he
could recommend to the court a modification of terms for the original owner.
As a consideration for this modification the owner would often be compelled
to make a further investment of capital int6 the property and also to agree
to make improvements and repairs so that the security of the certificate holders
would not be impaired.
In the past, the procedure followed by an owner who could not meet the
terms of a plan of reorganization was to seek a modification of the plan in
the state court. Recently, particularly in cases where the Schackno.trustee
has been unwilling to recommend a reduction in the scale of payments and
has instituted foreclosure proceedings, owners, in a desperate attempt to
save their property, have sought relief under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act. These attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court have been
vigorously opposed by the Schackno trustees.
7§ 10 of the Schackno Act, supra note 3; see Matter of Lawyers' Mortgage Co., 277
N. Y. 244, 250, 251, 14 N. E. (2d) 55 (1938).
8§ 6 of the Mortgage Commission Act, supra note'4.
9§ 7 (4) of the Mortgage Commission Act, supra note 4.
10See § 8 of the Schackno Act, supra note 3.
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It is feared that if petitions for reorganizations under Chapter X are
sustained in such cases the federal courts would be flooded with a mass of
litigation, that many of the reorganization "applecarts" in the state court would
be upset, that the beneficial results obtained for certificate holders during the
last six years would be nullified, and that the chaos from which they were
relieved in 1933 would be revived. The Schackno trustees further claim that
the state court is fully equipped and ready to render relief to those entitled
to it. Undoubtedly these are formidable reasons.
The Provisions of Chapter X
Let us now examine the legal arguments of the Schackno trustee and the
debtor. These depend upon the structure of Chapter X considered in its
entirety.
Section 14111 of Chapter X provides that upon the filing of a petition by a
debtor, the judge shall enter an order approving the petition if satisfied that
it complies with the requirements of the Chapter and has been filed in good
faith. This provision, which is substantially what the law was under former
Section 77B (a), 12 was included as part of the general legislative policy
which is present in other provisions of Chapter X to grant the district judge
the widest discretionary powers.' 3  Under Section 77-B (a), however,
Congress did hot attempt to declare what was meant by "good faith."
Congress laid the problem of interpretation of that term in the lap of the
courts. "Good faith," the courts declared, was present within the meaning
of Section 77-B (a) where the petition showed a need for reorganization and
where the reorganization had a reasonable probability of being effected.1
4
Honesty and good intentions were not enough to constitute good faith.
If it appeared that there was no hope at all of a successful reorganization at
the threshold of the proceeding then the petition was not filed in good faith.'6
When Congress enacted Chapter X, it attempted to embody therein a
number of standards of good faith which had been previously reflected by the
judicial interpretations under Section 77-B.' 6 But Congress was more
articulate in Chapter X, in order to provide a definite guide for the courts so
152 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 541 (1939).
1248 STAT. 912 (1934) as amended.
'
3h; re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 125, 127 (E. D. Ill. 1935).
14 R. L. Witters Associates, Inc. v. Ebsary Gypsum Co., 93 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 5th
1938) ; Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F. (2d) 284, 285 (C. C. A. 2d 1935); I re
Coney Island Hotel, 76 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
15 Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American National Bank, 299 U. S. 18, 57 Sup. Ct. 85 (1936);
Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, supra note 14; Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. University
Ev. L. Church, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).1 6 SEN. REP. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 27; H. R. REP. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 42.
[Vol. 27
CHAPTER X OR SCHACKNO ACT
that its dockets would not be dogged with imaginary and impracticable schemes
of salvation. 17 Thus Section 14618 of Chapter X sets forth certain standards
of a negative character by which the term "good faith" can be more easily
determined:
"Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the term 'good faith,'
a petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if-
(1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose
of filing the petition; or(2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition under
the provisions of chapter 11 of this Act; or
(3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be
effected; or
(4) a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the
interests of creditors would be best subserved in such prior proceeding."
The Schackno trustee usually relies on subsections (3) and (4) of Section
146. He takes the position that it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of
reorganization can be effected in the bankruptcy court and that the interests
of creditors and stockholders would not be best served in that proceeding.
The argument that it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization
can be effected is based on two grounds-first, that the debtor may be insolvent
and hence have no right to be heard on the plan, and second, that the Schackno
trustee is vested with the sole right to vote on the plan and will refuse to
consent to any plan which the debtor may propose.
The Insolvency of the Debtor
The theory of the Schackno trustee is that if a debtor is insolvent, its
stockholders have no equity in the property and consequently nothing to
protect. If the stockholders' interests are not to be affected by the reorganiza-
tion, they have no standing in the proceeding and therefore no right to be
heard on any plan.19 The Schackno trustee further makes the point that
if a debtor has no equity and a plan scales down the rights of certificate
holders it would have the effect of benefiting stockholders at the expense
17 See Tennessee Pub. Co. v. Amercan National Bank, supra note 15.
2852 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 546 (1939) ; see In re Reliable Estates, 33 F. Supp.
588 (E. D. N. Y. 1940). The introductory words of Section 146, "Without limiting the
generality," are explained by Gerdes as follows: "As a result of experience with pro-
ceedings under Section 77-B . .. , the statute specifically enumerates some of the circum-
stances which are deemed to indicate a lack of good faith, although these are not intended
to be all inclusive." Gerdes, Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
(1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8.
'
9 Under Section 206 of Chapter X, [52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 606 (1939)]
stockholders of an insolvent debtor would probably have the right to be heard on the
fairness of a plan, [see In re Reading Hotel Corporation, 10 F. Supp. 470 (D. C. Pa.
1935)] but under Section 179 [52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 579 (1939)], they would
not have the right to accept or reject a plan except perhaps upon a fair contribution.
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of the secured creditors, thus violating the doctrine of absolute priorities laid
down in the cases of Northern Pacific Co. v. Boyd20 and Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Co.2 ' Although this argument doubtless should carry weight after
the plan is proposed upon a consideration of its fairness, it is of no materiality
at the inception of the proceeding where only "good faith" in the filing of the
petition is at stake. Even if stockholders have no equity, a plan may never-
theless provide for some degree of participation for them upon a fair con-
tribution.2 2  If no contribution is later made by the debtor or stockholders,
then no provision for participation need be made for them. For these reasons,
the debtor's insolvency as a ground for dismissing a petition was held to be
untenable by the courts under former Section 77-B. In the case of In re
Central Funding Corporation,2 3 it was said that to restrict reorganizations to
a case where the debtor is solvent would deprive the section of much, if not
most, of its usefulness. This ruling is reflected in Section 179 of Chapter X.24
That section provides that as prerequisites to a hearing for confirmation of a
plan, the plan shall have been accepted in writing by the necessary majority
of creditors and that if the debtor shall not have been found to be insolvent, by
or on behalf of stockholders holding the majority of stock. In other words,
if the debtor is insolvent, a petition may nevertheless be filed in good faith;
but in that event the stockholders will have no right to vote upon the con-
firmation of the plan. In its interpretation of Chapter X, the circuit court in
the cases under discussion has followed the construction of the Act laid down
in Central Funding Corporation, supra, and has held that a petition may be
filed in good faith even when the debtor is insolvent.2 5
Is it unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected?
The second ground assigned by the Schackno trustee to show that it is
unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected is most,
ingenious. The trustee says that by virtue of the reorganization proceeding
in the state court the certificate holders had elected to change their property
20228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1913).
21308 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939). The doctrine of these cases is that stockholders
may not participate in a reorganization where the debtor is insolvent unless they make
a fresh and adequate contribution. See also Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. du Bois,
61 Sup. Ct. 675 (1941), holding that the absolute priority rule applies to reorganization
of solvent as well as insolvent companies.
22308 U. S. 106, 121. The new money obtainable from stockholders may be essential
to the success of a reorganization. See Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union
Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 455, 456, 46 Sup. Ct. 549 (1926).
2375 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d 1935). See also Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308
U. S. 106, 117, 121, 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939).
2452 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 579 (1939).251n re Castle Beach Apartments, 113 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; In re Blinrig
Realty Corporation, 114 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
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rights from those of co-owners of the bond and mortgage to those of bene-
ficiaries of an express trust, and that they had thereby surrendered all their
incidents of ownership including the right to vote in the reorganization. Now,
argues the Schackno trustee, since I have the sole right to vote and since I
register my unalterable opposition to any reorganization under Chapter X
no matter how beneficial it may be to the certificate holders, the court can
have no alternative but to dismiss the petition.26
If the Schackno trustee possesses the arbitrary power to vote for all
certificate holders, what is the source of this power? Admittedly, the Schackno
Act does not expressly bestow it upon the trustee. Nor is there any explicit
delegation of such a power in the deed of trust. So extensive a power should
scarcely be implied in view of the fact that Schackno trustees "are purely
statutory trustees possessing only such power and authority as is conferred
upon them by statute."2 7  Furthermore, it does not seem that even in the state
court would the Schackno trustee have the right to vote on a plan of re-
organization to the exclusion of the certificate holders. The special term of
the supreme court can approve the plan only if two-thirds in principal amount
of the certificate holders accept it.28
Does the Schackno trustee derive any greater power from the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act? Former Section 77-B (b) 1029 defined a creditor as
a holder of claims of all kinds against the debtor or its property. "Claims"
included securities other than stock, of whatever character. "Securities" in-
cluded evidences of indebtedness, either secured or unsecured, and certificates
of beneficial interests in property. Construing these provisions, the circuit
court, in In re Park-83rd Street Corporation,"° overruled the claim advanced
by a mortgage trustee that it could vote for all certificate holders and held
that a holder of a participation certificate in a mortgage was a holder of a
"claim" as thus defined in Section 77-B, and, therefore, that the creditor was
entitled to vote.31
26The trustee also argues that under the terms of his trust, he cannot consent to a
reorganization in the federal court without the approval of the state court. Of course,
if the consent of the trustee is not essential to a Chapter X reorganization, then the
approval of the state court is also unnecessary.27Weil v. President etc. of Manhattan Co., 275 N. Y. 238, 242, 9 N. E. (2d) 850 (1937).
28§ 7 (1) of the Mortgage Commission Act, supra note 4.
2948 STAT. 912 (1934) as amended.
3093 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). See also In re Sherman Square Apartments, 93
F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 658, 58 Sup. Ct. 763 (1938).311n In re Allied Owners Corporation, 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d 1934), the court
pointed out that if a trustee of a mortgage were allowed to vote for all bondholders, the
requirement in Section 77-B that a plan be accepted by two-thirds of each class of
creditors would be meaningless. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.,
238 Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916) ; Bitker v. Hotel Duluth Co., 83 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 8th
1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 42 (1936) ; Herbert v. Apartments Corp.
v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 98 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 3rd 1938).
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The trustee can gain no more solace from the provisions of Chapter X
than from Section 77-B. Section 106, subdivisions (1) and (4) ,32 which
together define the term "creditor," follow the language of former 77-B (10) ;
and if the reasoning of the Park-83rd Street case, supra,33 is still sound,*the
holder of the certificate is the creditor entitled to vote. This conclusion is
further fortified by other provisions in Chapter X. This Section 198,34 a
new provision in the Act, states that an indenture trustee "may file claims
for all holders, known or unknown, of securities issued pursuant to the
instrument under which he is trustee, who have not filed claims .... . In
computing the majority necessary for the acceptance of the plan, however,
"only the claims filed by the holders thereof, and allowed, shall be counted."
It would seem clear from this section that the term "holders" means the
certificate holders and not the indenture trustee. Moreover, Section 216
(10) 35 of Chapter X declares that a plan or reorganization may provide for the
cancellation or modification of indentures or other similar instruments; and
Section 22736 of Chapter X provides that the court may direct the debtor,
any mortgagee, or indenture trustee to execute or join in whatever instru-
ments may be necessary to effect a transfer of property under a plan, and
even to satisfy liens. Sections 216 and 227 could easily be nullified if a
Schackno trustee were able to defeat a plan simply by refusing to consent
to it, for the result would then be that the federal court could cancel or modify
an indenture only when the latter was willing to consent thereto.
The answer which the Schackno trustee makes to all these arguments is that
it is not an "indenture trustee" but a trustee of an express trust. The Schackno
trustee claims that he is in the position of a trustee of a bankrupt corporation
which owns a mortgage and that the certificate holders occupy a position which
corresponds to that of stockholders; or that he is in the position of a trustee
of a voluntary trust under a will with power to manage and liquidate for
certain legatees, and that the certificate holders hold a position similar to the
legatees.3 7 In neither case would the stockholders or legatees be entitled to
vote on a plan.
This reasoning seems to ignore the definition of an "indenture trustee" set
forth in Section 106 (8)38 of Chapter X. That section provides that" 'indenture
trustee' shall mean a trustee under a mortgage, deed of trust, or indenture,
3252 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 506 (1), (4) (1939).33Supra note 30.
3452 STAT. 893 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 598 (1939).
3552 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 616 (10) (1939).
3652 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 627 (1939).
37See Montgomery v. M'Dermott, 103 Fed. 801, 805, 806 (C. C. A. 2d 1900) ; cf. lit re
Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), where the mortgage was held
by a single creditor, the Metropolitan InsuranceCo.
3852 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 506 (8) (1939).
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pursuant to which there are securities outstanding, other than voting-trust
certificates, constituting claims against a debtor or claims secured by a lien
upon any of its property." It would seem that the Schackno trustee falls
within this comprehensive definition since it is a trustee either under a deed
of trust or indenture. Calling itself a trustee under an express trust instead
of an indenture trustee can not help it, for it merely has the powers customarily
committed to an indenture trustee, such as the collection of the income from the
trust estate and its conversion into other forms of security.
But even if the certificate holders had agreed expressly to disenfranchise
themselves, it is hardly open to question but that the court could under
Section 21239 of Chapter X disregard the agreement and allow them to vote.
As judge Chase, speaking for the circuit court, indicated in the Castle Beach4"
case, "They are trustees . . . acting as such for the benefit of the certificate
holders and may not vote in their stead unless, at least, the judge permits
that. Sec. 212 of the Bankruptcy Act. . . ." In the later case of In re
Blinrig Realty Corporation,41 the same proposition was urged again, but
Judge Chase adhered to his previous ruling. The trustee, he said, has "no
such certain power to block the acceptance of a plan in its capacity as
trustee." 42 It is submitted that this is a salutary principle. Once technicalities
are disregarded, it becomes obvious that the bondholders are the real creditors
and that it is their interests which are being affected. Therefore, they
should have the right to elect between the federal court proceeding and the state
court proceeding.
Is a prior proceeding pending in which the interests of creditors and
stockholders will be best served?
The other ground usually relied upon by the Schackno trustee in seeking a
\dismissal of the petition as not being filed in good faith is that a prior
Iproceeding is pending and that the interests of creditors and stockholders will
be best served in that proceeding. The prior proceeding which is pending
may be the Schackno proceeding which has not as yet been consummated or
a foreclosure proceeding instituted by the Schackno trustee after consummation.
That a prior proceeding is pending is not of itself enough to bar a petition
8952 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 612 (1939). "The Judge may examine and dis-
regard any provision of a ... trust mortgage, trust indenture or deed of trust..., may
restrain the exercise of any power which he finds to be unfair or not consistent with
public policy. .. ." A capricious refusal to vote for a plan which is definitely beneficial
might under this section disqualify the trustee from voting even if it had the power, on
the ground that the power was being exercised unfairly. It re 236 West 38th Street
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 667 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
40113 F. (2d) 762, at 764.
41Supra note 1.42114 F. (2d) 100, at 101.
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for reorganization from being filed in the federal court. Section 2564- of
Chapter X makes it clear that a petition may be filed under the Chapter
notwithstanding the pendency of a prior mortgage foreclosure. Moreover,
an examination of Section 146 (3)44 discloses that it requires more than a
prior proceeding pending in the state court to stamp a petition as being filed in
bad faith. The subdivision is conjunctive in character and requires also that
the interests of creditors and stockholders will be best served in that pending
proceeding.
It' is interesting to note, however, that in the three recent decisions of the
Second Circuit Court, Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Rembaugh, In re Castle Beach
Apartments, and In re Blinrig Realty Corporation, the court did not seem
to give consideration at all to the question of whether the interests of
creditors and stockholders would be better subserved in the prior pending
proceeding.
The Rembaugh, Castle Beach, and Blinrig Cases
In Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Rembaugh,45 the first of these cases, the debtor
had consented to a Schackno reorganization proposed by the Mortgage Com-
mission. The debtor met the payments provided for in the plan for several
years, when it defaulted. Foreclosure proceedings were instituted by the
Schackno trustee, and a receiver was appointed. The debtor tried to obtain
a modification of the state plan from the Schackno trustee and, failing in that,
filed its petition under Chapter X for reorganization. The district court
approved the petition as one filed in good faith, but the circuit court reversed.
Judge Chase, writing the opinion for the court, held that the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction by virtue of Section 256 which expressly conferred it, not-
withstanding the prior proceedings in the state court. He further declared
there was no fault to be found with the exercise by the district court of its
discretion in approving the petition "as one filed in good faith within the'
'broad meaning' of that term." But he held that there was another phase of
the requirement of good faith lacking. There was the fact that the debtor,
having previously assented to the plan in the state court, could not, when
it found the state order difficult to comply with, seek relief in the federal
court instead of the state court. In the words of Judge Chase, the debtor
"could not escape from the consequences of the plan to which it had assented
by simply filing a petition for reorganization in the federal court while the
proceedings in the state court were still pending."
46
4352 STAT. 902 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 656. See Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Rembaugh, supra
note 1, at p. 840.44Supra note 18.45Supra note 1.
46110 F. (2d) 838, at 840.
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Shortly thereafter, the same court decided the Castle Beach Apartment4
case. There, the debtor who filed under Chapter X was a purchaser of the
property upon a foreclosure sale which followed an unsuccessful attempt by
the original owner to reorganize under state law. The decision of the
district court finding the petition to be filed in good faith was affirmed. Judge
Chase found little merit in the argument that it was unreasonable to expect
that a reorganization could be effected because the debtor was insolvent. He
ruled also that the Schackno trustee had no right to vote for all the certificate
holders. Judge Chase then distinguished his own opinion in Brooklyn Trust Co.
v. Rembaugh, and said that the bad faith, which was imputed to the original
owner in that case because it sought relief from state court proceedings to which
it had previously assented, could not be imputed to the purchaser, the debtor
of the Castle Beach case, who had nothing to do with the prior state court
proceedings.
The last case to be decided in this series was In re Blinrig Realty Corpora-
tion.48 There the debtor never assented to a modification or reorganization in
the state court. Attempts were made at various times by the Schackno trustee
to obtain the acceptance of a plan by the debtor but without success. A plan
submitted in 1936 was refused by the debtor. A later attempt in 1937 to
modify and extend the mortgage was abandoned by him. After an action to
foreclose was begun by the Schackno trustee because of defaults in payment
of interest and principal, the owner filed its petition under Chapter X. The
district judge's decision finding the petition to be filed in good faith was
reversed.
Judge Chase, again writing for the Second Circuit Court, reaffirmed his
previous rulings that the state court proceeding was no bar in itself to relief
and that the Schackno trustee was not vested with the right to vote for all
certificate holders. But Judge Chase declared that good faith was lacking
because the history of the the debtor's efforts to reorganize in the state court
did not warrant the belief that the efforts in the federal court would be
crowned with any greater success. He said that a change of tribunals was
not enough to sustain the plea that the debtor's creditors would agree to a
plan containing less favorable terms than those proposed in the state court, or
that the debtor could do any better than he was able to do in the state court.
Of these three cases, both the debtor who assented to the state court plan
and tried in vain to comply with it and the debtor who refused to assent thereto
because he felt compliance would be difficult were denied relief in the federal
court. The only one for whQm the bars were let down was a purchaser from
the original owner upon the foreclosure in the state court. An interesting
4 Supra note 1.
4Slbid.
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question may arise if a nominee of an original owner purchased the property
upon the foreclosure. Would he hold the position of a stranger? If the
owner sold the property before foreclosure proceedings were instituted, would
the purchaser have the rights of a purchaser upon foreclosure? If he has the
same rights, a device is available to avoid the ruling of the Rembaugh and
Blinrig cases and to come within the ruling of the Castle Beach case. The
original owner need only form a new corporation to which he can sell or convey
his property or make the transfer to any "dummy.")49 The subterfuge could
not without difficulty be discovered and the original owner would, under the
guise of purchaser, be allowed to file a petition for reorganization.
It is questionable whether Congress contemplated any such distinction
between original owners and purchasers in enacting Section 146. Congress
was most concerned with the forum in which the interests of stockholders and
creditors would be best protected. Yet, as we have pointed out, the circuit
court is strangely silent on this crucial requirement. It seems that had the
court proceeded to inquire into that phase of the Act, as it was bound to do,
it would have found that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be
best subserved in the federal court.
The Rights of Creditors and Stockholders in the State Court
and in the Federal Court
So far as the certificate holders are concerned, a most persuasive argument
can be made that their rights would be better protected in the state court. If
the Schackno trustee foreclosed and bid in the property upon foreclosure,
the certificate holders would become the owners free and clear of the claims
of stockholders. Thereafter, if the property earned more than its fixed interest
rates, the surplus could be divided among the certificate holders as an additional
dividend instead of being paid to the stockholders. If the property were resold,
the proceeds of the sale after deduction of administration expenses could be,
divided pro rata among certificate holders.
Chapter X, however, contemplates the protection of the rights not only of
the secured creditors but likewise of stockholders and unsecured creditors.
It is perfectly plain that the continuance of a foreclosure would wipe out the
interests of these groups and prevent them from getting any relief whatever.
In a reorganization proceeding under Chapter X, fair and adequate treat-
ment would be made for them. If the debtor were insolvent some participation
could be given junior interests upon a reasonable contribution.5 0
4 9Formation of a corporation for express purpose of taking title to property and
for filing of petition in reorganization was held not sufficient to impute bad faith in In re
Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 7th 1936); but see It re North
Kenmore Bldg. Corporation, 81 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 7th 1936).5O0Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 Sup Ct. 1 (1939).
[Vol. 27
CHAPTER X OR SCHACKNO ACT
There are, however, many reasons to believe that the rights of secured
creditors may also be better protected in the federal court than in the state
court. In the first place, the doctrine of absolute priorities enunciated in
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Boyd5l and Case vr. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Company5 2 is applicable in Chapter X but finds no currency in state
court reorganizations. Assurance is thereby given that the rights of senior
classes of creditors will not be disturbed by concessions to junior classes
unless the latter provide-a fair and adequate consideration for what they
receive. Secondly, the structure of Chapter X offers many other protective
considerations.
In large cases where the liabilities exceed $250,000, an independent dis-
interested trustee must,be appointed. 53  The attorney for this trustee must
also be disinterested." The trustee, upon appointment and qualification, must
investigate the property, and its management and operation and the desirability
of its continuance.5 5 The trustee must report to the judge in charge concern-
ing any fraud, misconduct, or mismanagement. 56 The results of the investiga-
tion are sent'to creditors and stockholders and the latter are asked to suggest
proposals to be included in the plan.57 Before approving a plan, a judge may
seek the aid of the Securities and Exchange Commission for an advisory
report. ,8 Notice of the hearing on the plan is then given to creditors and
stockholders.5 9 Consent of the court is required for solicitation of acceptances
of the plan, else the acceptance is invalid.60 The district judge must make
an independent inquiry of the fairness of the plan; he must examine the new
capital structure; he must make a finding that the earning capacity of the
new enterprise will be sufficient to meet fixed charges; he must determine
whether the distribution of new securities fairly reflects existing rights and
whether all rights are equitably treated.61 After the plan is scrutinized by the
judge and the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is submitted with all
51228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1913).
52308 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939).53Section 156, 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 556 (1939) ; SEN. REP. mepra note 16,
at p. 19.54Section 157, 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 557 (1939).
55Section 167 (1), 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 567 (1) (1939).56Section 167 (3), 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 567 (3) (1939).57Section 167 (5), (6), 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 567 (5), (6) (1939).5USection 172, 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 572 (1939). In re 263 West 38th
Street Corp., 37 F. Supp. 667 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); see Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. United States Realty and Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 60 Sup. Ct. 1044
(1940).59Section 171, 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 571 (1939).
G0Section 176, 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 576 (1939).61Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., supra note 52, at p. 115; Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v. du Bois, supra note 21; see It re United Railways and Electric Co., 11 F. Supp. 717
(D. C. Md. 1935).
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other available data and reports to parties interested for consideration, so that
they can benefit from the analysis to which it has been subjected. 62  If the
plan has been accepted by the necessary majorities, a hearing is held for its
confirmation upon due notice to all creditors and stockholders. 63 If the plan
is fair, equitable, and feasible,* and if its proposal and acceptance are in good
faith and not in violation of any of the prohibitions contained in the Act, it
will be confirmed.6 4  The court's investigation does not stop here but is
directed even to the methods by which the management of the reorganized
corporation is to be chosen in order to insure adequate representation for the
interests of all creditors and stockholders.6 5  Also, to that end, the judge may
pass upon the qualifications of the management and voting trustees, if any,
upon the consummation of the plan.6 6  Finally, the court has full power to
review all fees and expenses in connection with the reorganization from
whatever source they may be payable.6 7' In that way, every possible safeguard
is maintained for the protection of every class. The Schackno Act, on the
other hand, does not provide for corresponding safeguards. Particularly is
it lacking in a device whereby the certificate holders, unsecured creditors,
and stockholders receive a full and impartial report from a disinterested
trustee, and whereby the court obtains the benefit of an expert advisory report
from a public agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. This
in itself is a sufficient guaranty that the proceedings under Chapter X will
be exercised for the benefit of all parties.
In analyzing the decisions of the circuit court in the Rembaugh and Blinrig
cases it is important to understand, first, what is the real basis which underlies
these decisions and, second, whether this basis has any validity in law or
reason.
What was the basis of the Rembaugh case? Surely it was not the consent,
to the prior proceeding in the state court which caused the court to impute
bad faith to the debtor. For if it were consent, then by the same token in
62Section 175, 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 575 (1939).63Section 179, 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 579 (1939).
*See Gilchrist, "Fair and Equitable" Plan of Reorganization: A Clearer Concept (1941)
26 CORNELL L. Q. 592; see also Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations
(1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 537. [Ed.]64Section 221 (2), (3), 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 621 (2), (3) (1939).65Section 221 (5), 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 621 (5) (1939).66Section 216 (11), 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 616 (11) (1939) ; see SEN. REP.
supra note 16, at p. 35.67Section 221 (4), 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 621 (4) (1939). Under the
ruling of Woods v. City National Bank & T. Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 493 (1941), a petitioner for
allowances who has served conflicting interests will be denied compensation even though
no fraud or unfairness have been shown. While the state court passes on fees of the
trustee and his attorneys, its power is not as comprehensive as the federal court.
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the Blinrig case, where consent to the prior proceeding was lacking, the court
should have found that the petition was filed in good faith. Certainly, too, it
was not that a prior petition was pending in the state court because, as the
court admitted, Section 256 of Chapter X expressly provides for that con-
tingency. The sole ground remaining common to both cases was that the
debtors were seeking to escape from terms demanded in the state court with
which they found it difficult to comply. In the last analysis, the circuit court
was examining the motives of these debtors although good faith, which is a
question of fact, had already been determined in favor of the debtors by the
district court to whose care and discretion the question had been committed
by statute. This is opposed to the rule in bankruptcy cases where the motives
of a party instituting a bankruptcy petition are considered to be immaterial. 6
If a debtor files its petition in bankruptcy for the sole purpose of wiping out
his debts, his discharge is not denied on that account nor is the right to file
the petition barred. That was the purpose of the Act.69 Now admittedly, one
of the main purposes of Section 77-B and the Chandler Act was to avoid the
drastic consequences of foreclosure and liquidation.70 A logical corollary to
this proposition is that a debtor may be relieved from the severity of its
obligations. There is nothing unusual about this. Thus it is well settled that
bankruptcy proceedings may modify and affect property rights established
by state law, including a mortgage contract.7 1 Indeed, the Chandler Act was
included in the Bankruptcy Act so that the constitutional right which exists
in bankruptcy to modify contracts over the protest of minority groups would
be available in reorganization proceedings also. 72 One of the means of
effectuating that purpose is found in Section 216.73 That section provides
that a plan of reorganization may include adequate means for the execution
of the plan, which among other things may involve the rejection of executory
contracts, the satisfaction or modification of liens, the cancellation or modifica-
GM;n re Dressier Producing Corporation, 262 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 2d 1919) ; Struthers
Furnace Co. v. Grant, 30 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 6th 1929).
69Ibid.
7oH. R. REP. supra note 16, at p. 38; H. R. REP. 194, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. p. 2; Kuehner
v. Irving Trust, 299 U. S. 445, 452, 57 Sup. Ct. 298 (1937) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Co., supra note 52, at p. 124.
l-lWright v. Union Central Insurance Co., 304 U. S. 502, 516, 58 Sup. Ct. 1025 (1938);
Wright v. Venton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, 470, 57 Sup. Ct. 556 (1937).72 FINLET'TER, THE LAw OF BANKRU PTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) 25; see I re Allied
Owner's Corporation, supra note 31.
7352 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 616 (1939). This section was derived from former
Section 77-B, [48 STAT. 912 (1934) as amended] which was held to be constitutional in
In re Central Funding Corporation, supra note 23. Also, under Section 116 (3), 52
STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 516 (3), the trustee may upon good cause shown and
order of the court borrow money upon certificates of indebtedness which will be given
priority over existing mortgage liens. In re Prima, 88 F. 2d 785 (C. C. A. 7th 1938).
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tion of indentures, the curing or waiving of debts. And, of extreme pertinency
to proceedings pending in state courts similar to those under Schackno
reorganizations, Section 216 (10) provides for extensions of maturity dates
and changes in interest rates and other terms of outstanding securities.
In view of this section and the others already adverted to, any claim that
a debtor may not seek relief in the federal court when it finds the state order
difficult to comply with disregards the plain words of the Act. Obviously,
a debtor will seek a modification in the federal court only in order to be
relieved of "irksome" conditions-not when they are easy to comply with.
And the simple fact is that the typical debtor who turns to the federal court
has already been turned away by the state court. If the Schackno trustee
refuses to recommend a modification of terms, it is rare that a special term court
will override the trustee's decision. What recourse is left for the debtor then?
The law does not require him to take successive, expensive, and perhaps
fruitless appeals. 74 Congress has provided a remedy in the federal court that is
economical, swift, and fair. As Mr. Justice Hughes declared in a case75 in-
volving a proceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, a debtor should
not be charged with bad faith because it takes the course provided for it by
Congress. Only recently, a similar observation was made by the circuit court
of appeals with respect to a proceeding filed under Chapter XI of the
Chandler Act. In reply to the appellant's contention that the debtor's petition
was not filed in good faith but merely to get rid of the state receivership,
Judge Swan said, "The answer is that the debtor has a legal right to have
her property administered in bankruptcy. '76
Let us suppose that instead of a voluntary petition in reorganization the
proceeding had been an involuntary one instituted by unsecured creditors
whose claims had been incurred after the approval of the Schackno reorganiza-
tion. No valid argument could be made that the bar to a debtor's petition
operated likewise to bar these creditors. Yet it would seem to follow that if
the court would have entertained an involuntary petition against the debtor
it likewise should where a voluntary petition filed by the debtor is involved.
Nor is there any sound reason why the debtor's consent to the state court
proceedings forecloses it in the federal court.77 Admittedly, by so consenting
74See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 241, 242, 58 Sup. Ct. 695 (1934) ; Gross
v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342, 345, 53 Sup. Ct. 605 (1932).
75John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180, 185, 58 Sup. Ct. 605
(1939) ; see also In re Surf Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 295, 296 (E. D. II1. 1934) (petition
in 77-B).
76In re Koch, 116 F. (2d) 243, 247 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).77Consent to pending state court proceedings was given but the question was not
squarely raised that such consent barred relief in the federal court in It re Union National
Bank v. Lehmann-Higginson Grocer Co., 82 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 10th 1936) ; It re
Cloisters Bldg. Corp., 79 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 7th 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 657, 56
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it did not also agree not to resort to a federal reorganization. A debtor's
consent to a judgment in the state court or a composition, or an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, nevertheless, leaves him free to apply to a bank-
ruptcy court in order to wipe out the judgment or to nullify the composition
or assignment.78  So also, creditors who are parties to, or consent to, state
court proceedings are not thereafter barred from joining as petitioning creditors
in involuntary proceedings.7 9 Indeed, it would seem that an express agreement
by a debtor not to avail itself of its constitutional rights in bankruptcy would
be declared void as being against public policy.80  And had the Schackno Act
declared that as a condition to reorganizing in the state court the debtor thereby
waived his rights in futuro to file under Chapter X, there can be little doubt
that it would be invalid.8 ' Yet the result of the decisions of the circuit court
is to endow the state statute with that very force which the state legislators
themselves were powerless to give to it.
The issue involved here, however, is not one of the power of the bankruptcy
court to supersede the state court proceedings. That right is unquestioned
and beyond dispute. The problem rather is one of policy. Shall the state
court be permitted to retain its jurisdiction? To accept that view is, in effect,
to surrender to the state court the paramount and exclusive jurisdiction which
the federal courts have always exercised in the field of bankruptcy and
reorganization. This superior jurisdiction is manifested in many ways where
proceedings are first instituted in state courts. Thus, state banking laws
relative to bank insolvencies8 2 or state laws which purport to grant a discharge
to a debtor of his debts8 3 are superseded by the Bankruptcy Law. An assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors or composition under state law must give
way to the bankruptcy laws, and the assignee may be required by summary
order to turn over the assets in his bands to the trustee in bankruptcy.8 4 The
Sup. Ct. 382 (1936), the courts merely holding that the petitions were filed in good faith
despite the pending state court proceedings. See also cases cited supra note 68.78See Matter of Denton & Haskins Music Pub. Co., 10 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S. D. N. Y.
1935) ; Struthers Furnace Co. v. Grant, supra note 68.
79In re Curtis, 91 Fed. 737 (S. D. Ii. 1889), aff'd, 94 Fed. 630 (C. C. A. 7th 1889);
It re Greenberg, 23 F. Supp. 836 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).80See In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) ; In re Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 24 F. Supp. 501, 515, 516 (D. C. Cal. 1938), aff'd, 100 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A.
9th 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939) ; cf. Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, supra note 74.81It re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, 103 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 6th 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 351 (1939). See In re Drake Motor and Tire Mfg.
Corporation, 16 F. (2d) 142 (D. Tenn. 1923).8 2 1It re Bajardi, 8 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 2d 1926), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 651 (1926);
In re Prudence Co., 79 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 646, 56 Sup.
Ct. 247 (1935).83International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 108 (1929).84Section 3 (a) 5, 30 STAT. 546 (1898) as amended, 32 STAT. 797 (1903), 11 U. S. C.
§ 21 a (5) ; In re Louis Newberger, 233 Fed. 701 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 240 Fed. 947
(C. C. A. 2d 1917).
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power of the state court to fix the compensation of receivers and to name
counsel for receivers comes to an end with the supervening bankruptcy and
then vests in the bankruptcy courts.8 5 In these cases the state proceedings or
laws were suspended because they conflicted with or encroached upon the
paramount jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. The wisdom of this course
in the extension of federal jurisdiction should be recognized also in cases
where a debtor who previously reorganized under the Schackno Act seeks to
have his real property administered in a federal reorganization court. It must
be kept firmly in mind that the Schackno Act was designed primarily to be of
assistance to certificate holders. It therefore can scarcely be seized as a
vehicle of aid for a failing debtor. Nor can it be considered as the equivalent
of the federal reorganization statute in which the claims of all creditors and
stockholders are impartially adjusted and determined.
Conclusion
From a reading of the provisions of Chapter X, its history and background,
it is clear that Congress intended to abandon state courts as a forum for
corporate reorganizations and to concentrate proceedings of that character in
the federal court. Jurisdiction should not be disclaimed because of "con-
venience,"8 6 or comity,8 7 or because of the groundless fear that the federal
court would be flooded with cases. There is every reason to believe that the
federal court will be just as zealous in its protection of the rights of all parties
as will the state court. It is surely as well equipped as is the state court to
handle these cases. Moreover, Chapter X affords an expeditious and economic
method of reorganization, and, as demonstrated above, offers many protective
safeguards not to be found under the Schackno proceedings.
By holding that a debtor may not seek relief in the federal court because
it finds conditions "irksome" in the state court and difficult to comply with,
the circuit court has substituted its own standard of good faith for that of the
Act. The provisions of Section 146 (4) in Chapter X preclude an assertion
of good faith when two factors are present: (1) that a prior proceeding is
pending in another court, and (2) that the interests of creditors and stock-
holders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding. The circuit court
by its rulings in the Rembaugh and Blinrig cases has, in effect, found bad
faith in the filing of the petition merely from the pendency of the state court
85Gross v. Irving Trust, supra note 74; Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U. S. 470, 55 Sup. Ct.
260 (1934).8 6In1 re Manbeach Realty Corporation, 10 F. Supp. 523 (E. D. N. Y. 1935); In re
Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413, 416 (C. C. A. 7th 1935).
87Cf. Matter of Amawalk Nursery, Inc. (not reported), Southern District of New
York No. 60774, Judge Knox; It re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d
1935).
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proceedings. It has failed, however, to inquire whether the rights of creditors
and stockholders would be best subserved therein. This narrow construction
of a remedial statute88 only tends to whittle away the broad power of the
bankruptcy court of reorganizations and to defeat the plain intent of Congress.
For these reasons, it is submitted, the Reinbaugh and Blinrig rulings need
reconsideration and revision.8 9
8sChapter X is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed. See In re Lake's
Laundry, 79 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 622, 56 Sup. Ct. 144
(1935), construing Section 77-B.89See In re Julius Roehrs Co., 115 F. (2d) 723 (C. C. A. 3d 1940). The Rembaugh,
Blinrig, and Castle Beach cases are referred to and discussed in recent cases in the
Southern District Court of New York. In re 263 West 38th St. Corporation, supra note
39, per Judge Hulbert; In the Matter of Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. (not reported),
No. 79473 (Sept. 30, 1941), per Judge Bright (petitions under Chapter X sustained);
In re Paloma Estates (not reported) No. 78958 (July 25, 1941), per Judge Knox (petition
dismissed).
